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Comment

An Onerous Burden: The Impact of Nassar
Upon McDonnell Douglas in the
Eleventh Circuitt

I.

INTRODUCTION

Following a flood of employment discrimination and retaliation cases,
the United States Supreme Court in University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar' announced that an employee alleging
retaliation must prove that the employer's motive to retaliate constituted
a "but for" cause of the actions adverse to the employee.2 In addition to
creating an awkward and unprecedented union of employment law and
traditional tort principles of causation,' this decision upended the
conventional application of the framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green' and left the lower courts to pick up the pieces.

t. The Author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor McMurtry-Chubb, whose
invaluable advice improved this Comment immeasurably.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
2. Id. at 2534.
3. See William R. Corbett, What is TroublingAbout the Tortification of Employment
DiscriminationLaw?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027 (2014).
4. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a retaliation claim
requires the plaintiff-employee who lacks direct evidence of retaliation
to establish that: she engaged in a protected activity, the defendantemployer took an action adverse to her, such as termination of her
employment, and that a causal connection existed between the protected
activity and the adverse action.' After the plaintiff establishes these
three elements of her prima facie case, the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to offer a legitimate reason for its adverse action against the
plaintiff, at which point the burden again shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the adverse action was merely pretextual and that the defendant's
retaliatory motive was the real reason for the action.6 However, because
the Supreme Court in Nassar did not explain the impact of its holding
upon the McDonnell Douglas framework, a circuit split has developed as
to whether the plaintiff must prove "but for" causation as part of the
prima facie stage or, ultimately, in the pretext stage.
This Comment explores the responses to Nassarby the federal courts.
After a brief survey of the holdings of the circuit courts of appeal, this
Comment traces a development peculiar to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which initially indicated that the
burden properly belongs in the pretext stage. Subsequently, the Eleventh
Circuit inexplicably reversed itself and now uniformly places the burden
in the prima facie stage. Moreover, this pattern has almost exclusively
unfolded in unpublished opinions, as federal courts, with a few
exceptions, have demonstrated a curious reluctance to address the
reasoning behind their decisions on this issue. After examining the best
arguments put forward for each position, this Comment investigates the
policy considerations underlying the debate and concludes that the
Supreme Court should ultimately resolve the circuit split by requiring
proof of causation in the pretext stage to effect the original purpose of
McDonnell Douglas.
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

McDonnell Douglas Framework

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 prohibits employers from
discriminating against their employees on the bases of race, color,

5. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2009).
6. Id. at 1308.
7. Askins v. Starting Point, No. 4:12-cv-3547-RBH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112737, at
*5 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2014).
8. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 241(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2012)).
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religion, sex, or national origin.9 Likewise, Title VII forbids employer
discrimination against employees who oppose practices made unlawful
by Subchapter VI or for making or participating in a charge or proceeding under the subchapter."o
When alleging retaliation in violation of Section 2000-e(3)(a), a
plaintiff may proceed either by providing direct evidence of the
employer's retaliatory motive or by following the analytical framework
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" and modified in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine." Under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
retaliation by showing that "(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) he
established a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action."" If the plaintiff successfully establishes the elements of the
prima facie case, the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence
sufficient to "articulatle] a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action."" If the defendant meets that burden,
thereby rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to show "that the defendant's proffered reason was
merely a pretext to mask discriminatory actions.""
Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff may prove
her prima facie case and show the pretextuality of the employer's
proffered reason by putting on different kinds of evidence. In the
Eleventh Circuit, for example, the plaintiff may rely on close temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse
action to demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage." Although
the Eleventh Circuit has not defined the precise contours of "close
temporal proximity," it has held that the two events must be very close
in sequence; while a two-month gap between the protected activity and
the adverse action may be sufficient, a three-month gap is not because
the events are too attenuated in time." However, where the temporal
gap is too large for the plaintiff to demonstrate proximity in time, the
plaintiff may nevertheless overcome the deficiency by showing that the

9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
11. 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
12. 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
13. Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1307-08.
14. Id. at 1308.
15. Id.
16. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004).
17. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007); Farley v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999).
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employer retaliated at the earliest available opportunity." Likewise,
the plaintiff may also surmount a significant temporal gap by providing
evidence of a "pattern of antagonism" on the part of the employer."
At the pretext stage, the plaintiff must rebut each of the defendant's
proffered legitimate reasons for its adverse action." To do so, the
plaintiff must show that each ostensibly legitimate reason was, in fact,
pretextual and the defendant's retaliatory animus constituted the real
reason for the adverse action. 2 ' At the pretext stage, the plaintiff may
no longer rely on temporal proximity alone to rebut the defendant's
proffered reasons. 2 However, temporal proximity may constitute some
evidence of pretext.2 3 Additionally, a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext
by pointing to the "employer's failure to articulate clearly and consistently the reason for [the] employee's discharge."24 Likewise, the "employer's deviation from its own standard procedures" may indicate that its
putative reason was merely a post-hoc ruse adopted solely for purposes
of litigation, allowing the plaintiff to carry her burden at the pretext
stage.25
Although federal courts had addressed the kinds of evidence sufficient
for the plaintiff to present a prima facie case and to establish that the
defendant's proffered reason was pretextual, no uniform standard of
causation governed retaliation cases. To prove causation in a statusbased discrimination claim pursuant to Section 2000-e(2)(a), a plaintiff
need only establish that one of the employer's motives was discriminatory; this rule is referred to as the "motivating factor" test.2 6 Although
the McDonnell Douglas framework similarly requires that the plaintiff
in a retaliation claim establish the element of causation, McDonnell
Douglas and its progeny left unclear whether the plaintiff must merely
prove "motivating-factor" causation or meet some higher standard of
causation. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
the Supreme Court of the United States announced that the plaintiff in
a Title VII retaliation case must prove causation according to traditional
tort principles of "but for" causation.2 7

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Jones v. Suburban Propane, Inc., 577 F. App'x 951, 955 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
Id.
Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001).
Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 1299.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id. at 2534.
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Nassar

In Nassar, the plaintiff, a physician of Middle Eastern descent, worked
at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center and Parkland
Memorial Hospital. He alleged that his supervisor displayed her bias
against his religion and ethnicity through such comments as "Middle
Easterners are lazy."2 The plaintiff eventually resigned from his
position at the University due to the alleged harassment, and he
informed the Chair of Internal Medicine of his supervisor's behavior in
a letter. Subsequently, the Chair told the Hospital to withdraw its offer
of a staff physician job to the plaintiff, resulting in plaintiff's suit for
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. 29 After the jury
found for the plaintiff on both claims, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the retaliation award, holding that claims
of retaliation require the plaintiff to prove only "motivating factor"
causation.o
Noting that traditional tort principles of causation require the plaintiff
to establish that the harm would not have taken place "but for" the
defendant's actions, the Supreme Court observed that these rules must
be assumed to have been incorporated into Title VII by Congress.3 ' The
Court then discussed its prior decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,32 wherein a plurality held that a plaintiff in a status-discrimination Title VII case must show that her status was a motivating or
substantial factor in the adverse employment action, while the employer
could defeat the claim by demonstrating that its discriminatory motive
was not a "but for" cause of its action against the employee.
Subsequent to Price Waterhouse, the Court in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.," interpreted the phrase "because of ... age" in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 5 to require "but for"
causation. 36 Given the similar language in Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision, the Court concluded that the motive to retaliate must be a
"but for" cause of the adverse employment action in a Title VII

28. Id. at 2523.
29. Id. at 2523-24.
30. Id. at 2524.
31. Id. at 2525.
32. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
33. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality
opinion)). Price Waterhouse was codified in part by the 1991 Amendments to Title VII.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
34. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
36. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527.
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retaliation case.3 7 Both the plaintiff and the United States, as amicus
curiae, opposed this reading of the statute on the basis that retaliation
is defined by the statute as unlawful employment conduct and that such
conduct is prohibited by Section 2000e-2(m)," which requires the
plaintiff to meet only the "motivating factor" test." However, the Court
noted that § 2000e-2(m) applied the "motivating factor" test only to
status-based discrimination based on the plaintiff's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, not to retaliation.4 0 Because Congress could
have applied the "motivating factor" standard of causation to all
unlawful practices but failed to do so, the Court interpreted the statute
in accordance with its ordinary meaning, a necessity given the precision
and complexity of the Title VII statutory scheme."
Critically, the Court justified its reading of the statute on the basis of
judicial economy, noting that a lesser causation standard would
incentivize employees to file frivolous claims against their employers.4 2
Citing the increasing frequency of Title VII retaliation claims in recent
years, the Court offered a hypothetical involving an employee who,
anticipating termination or a similar adverse employment action, makes
a preemptive, baseless claim of discrimination to lay the groundwork for
a later retaliation charge when the adverse action finally occurs."
Although the employer in such a case might succeed at trial, according
to the Court, use of the lessened "motivating factor" causation standard
would prevent such a case from being dismissed on summary judgment,
as the mere fact that the plaintiff had raised an earlier discrimination
claim might be sufficient to constitute a motivating factor for the
subsequent adverse action." To increase the employer's costs of
litigation and the risk of damage to the employer's reputation "would be
inconsistent with the structure and operation of Title VII," the Court
averred." In other words, the heightened "but for" causation standard
serves the interests of the judicial system and employers by preventing
frivolous litigation from proceeding to trial.
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the "symbiotic"
relationship between the antidiscrimination and antiretaliation
provisions of Title VII requires plaintiffs to meet the same burdens of

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 2528.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2014).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
Id.
Id. at 2529.
Id. at 2531-32.
Id. at 2532.
Id.
Id.
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proof in both types of cases." By including the antidiscrimination
provisions, Congress sought to create a workplace environment in which
all employees would be treated equally, regardless of race, ethnicity,
religion, or sex.47 However, Title VII's prohibition on discrimination
would be rendered meaningless if employees refused to file grievances
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaints out
of fear of retaliation. 8 Because retaliation is "an intentional response
to the nature of the complaint," it constitutes a form of discrimination. 9 By ruling that a retaliation claim requires proof of "but for"
causation, Justice Ginsburg averred, the Court has undermined the will
of Congress by separating retaliation claims from discrimination claims,
which require only a "motivating factor" standard of causation."
In addition to her textual argument against the Court's reading of
Title VII, Justice Ginsburg countered the majority's judicial economy
argument. Noting that plaintiffs often bring discrimination claims and
retaliation claims in a single action and that "[c]ausation is a complicated concept to convey to juries in the best of circumstances," she asserted
that requiring jurors to sort out liability based on multiple standards of
causation "is virtually certain to sow confusion."" Absent a statutory
mandate for double standards of causation, the added practical
difficulties imposed on the district courts and juries in Title VII cases
militate against the majority's requirement of proving "but for" causation
in retaliation claims.5 2
Moreover, although. the "but for" causation standard makes sense in
tort cases involving physical forces and their consequences, such a
standard requires the jurors to determine which one of the employer's
multiple motives actually prompted that the adverse action against the
employee." Such an inquiry may be practically impossible, given that
the employer rarely will act based on a single motive.54 In light of these
unnecessary burdens on district courts and juries, Justice Ginsburg
accused the majority of being "driven by a zeal to reduce the number of
retaliation claims filed against employers" rather than being guided by
precedent or the intent of Congress."

46. Id. at 2537.

47. Id.
48.

Id.

49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 2539-40.
Id. at 2546.
Id.
Id. at 2547.
Id.
Id.
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Although the Court held that a Title VII retaliation claim requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant's retaliatory motive constituted a
"but for" cause of the adverse employment action, the Court did not
elucidate the relationship between this causation standard and the
McDonnell Douglas framework in cases lacking direct evidence of the
defendant's motive. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof in the prima facie and pretext stages
of the case, and the Court left the federal district and appellate courts
to determine at which of the two stages the plaintiff must prove "but for"
causation.
C.

The Eleventh Circuit Places the Burden in the Pretext Stage

Due to the Supreme Court's unwillingness to harmonize Nassar with
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the federal appellate courts have
gradually begun to reach contrary decisions as to whether the plaintiff's
burden of proving "but for" causation properly belongs in the prima facie
stage or the pretext stage of McDonnell Douglas, resulting in a circuit
split that persists at the time of the writing of this Comment. Excluding
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals-the jurisprudence of which has
been severely muddled on this issue-most circuit courts appear to have
placed the burden in the prima facie stage of the framework, while a
minority place it in the pretext stage.
Of the circuit courts that have held that a plaintiff in a retaliation
case under McDonnell Douglas must prove "but for" causation in the
prima facie stage, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has announced its holding in the most explicit language,
concluding that the "employee 'must establish that his or her protected
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the
employer.'"" However, this statement came in the context of an
unpublished memorandum opinion that has not gained a significant
following, and the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the issue in any
subsequent opinions.
Other circuits have been more ambiguous. For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, after enumerating the
elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case, explained that the Supreme
Court in Nassar clarified that, as to the causation prong, the plaintiff
must establish "but for" causation." Overall, the First, Third, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits appear to have concluded that the

56. Campbell v. Hagel, 536 F. App'x 733, 734 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Nassar, 133 S.
Ct. at 2534).
57. Verma v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 533 F. App'x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534).
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burden belongs in the prima facie stage, although none of those circuits
has provided any sustained argument on behalf of the position."
The same pattern has developed among those circuit courts of appeal
that have placed the burden in the pretext stage, with one notable
exception. A representative example comes from the analysis of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kwan v.
Andalex Group, LLC," wherein the court described the stages of
McDonnell Douglas before reciting the holding of Nassar, implying by
juxtaposition that Nassar only impacts the burden at the pretext
stage."o Similar conclusory language and implications can be found in
the opinions of other circuits adopting the pretext stage as the proper
location, such as that of the Fifth Circuit, which announced that a
plaintiff demonstrates pretext "by showing that the adverse action would
not have occurred 'but for' the employer's retaliatory motive."6 1To date,
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits all appear to have placed
the burden in the pretext stage of McDonnell Douglas." Unique among
these circuits is the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

58. See Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015)
(noting that the plaintiff "proceeded under the direct method, which required him to
produce evidence that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, that he suffered a
materially adverse action, and that [the employer's] desire to retaliate was the but-for
cause of the adverse action"); Musolf v. J.C. Penney Co., 773 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 2014)
(noting that "[t]he burden to show a prima facie case is not difficult, but one must show
some causation" and that "[t]he Supreme Court recently held retaliation claims brought
under Title VII must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation");
Davis v. Unified Sch. Dist. 500, 750 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that the
plaintiff must show "a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse
employment action" and that "[tihe Supreme Court has recently clarified the causation
standard" to require a showing of but for causation); Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of
Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that the prima facie case requires a
plaintiff to show "that a 'causal nexus exists between the protected [conduct] and the
adverse action'") (quoting Ponte v. Steelcase, Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 321 (1st Cir. 2014));
Verma, 533 F. App'x at 119 (noting that "as to the third prong [of the prima facie case, i.e.
causation], a plaintiff . . . 'must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for
cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer"') (quotingNassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534);
Campbell, 536 F. App'x at 734 (noting that "to establish a prima facie retaliation claim
under Title VII, an employee 'must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for
cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer'") (quoting Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534).
59. 737 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 845. The court also explicitly stated, "However, the but-for causation standard
does not alter the plaintiffs ability to demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage on
summary judgment or at trial indirectly through temporal proximity." Id.
61. Feist v. Louisiana, 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).
62. Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015); Montell
v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir. 2014); Feist, 730 F.3d at 454;
Kwan. 737 F.3d at 845.
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Circuit, which provided a detailed argument in favor cf its position, as
discussed in subsection E, infra."
In Ramirez v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,64 the Eleventh Circuit received
its first opportunity to apply the holding in Nassarto a retaliation claim
involving only circumstantial evidence. Beginning what would later
become a trend, the court failed to squarely address Nassar's impact,
instead punting that question to the district courts. In Ramirez, the
plaintiff, a quality control inspector for the defendant company, reported
perceived violations of the company's standard operating procedures and
federal regulations.6 5 His subsequent refusal to perform prompted his
termination for insubordination," resulting in his lawsuit brought
pursuant to the Florida Whistleblower Act,6 7 claims under which
receive the same analytical framework as Title VII retaliation claims due
to the lack of controlling state law."
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant in a
per curiam opinion, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove a causal
connection between his protected activity and termination." On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the case, holding that the
district court failed to consider certain evidence that might have
established causation.o In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit first
addressed the applicability of Nassar to a Title VII retaliation claim
based on circumstantial evidence, noting that "the [Supreme] Court did
not clarify the role of 'but for' causation in a plaintiff's prima facie case,"
with the result that "when considering the expanded group of allegedly
protected activity on remand, the district court may need to consider
whether Ramirez has sufficiently satisfied 'but for' causation in this
case."" Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Supreme Court's
lead by declining to clarify at which stage of the proceeding the plaintiff
must prove "but for" causation, leaving the district courts to fill the void.
In its next pronouncement on the question, the Eleventh Circuit
appeared to finally take a position, indicating that the plaintiff must
establish "but for" causation in the pretext stage of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. In Mealing v. Georgia Department of Juvenile

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Foster, 787 F.3d 243.
546 F. App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 830.
Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102 (West 2013).
Ramirez, 546 F. App'x at 830, 831.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 833 n.2.
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Justice,7 2 the plaintiff, a juvenile correctional officer, engaged in a
sexual relationship with a supervisor who utilized her authority to
pressure him to do so. The plaintiff filed unsuccessful EEOC complaints
and, after various disciplinary infractions, filed internal grievances and
sent letters to his superiors. The plaintiff ultimately received a
termination letter from the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Department
because the plaintiff failed to establish pretext. In another per curiam
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the
plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of any alleged fabrication of his
disciplinary record. Moreover, in discussing the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the court stated that when the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate reason
for the adverse action, which, if carried, shifts the burden again to the
plaintiff to "show that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer for
taking the adverse action were pretexts for unlawful retaliation ... and
that the plaintiff's protected activity was the 'but-for' cause of the
adverse action." 7 6 Applying that standard, the court held that the
plaintiff failed to establish "but for" causation because he offered no
evidence that he would not have been terminated but for his grievances
and letters.7 ' Therefore, for the first time, the Eleventh Circuit
appeared to have decisively located the plaintiff's burden of proving "but
for" causation at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
However, subsequent decisions cast doubt upon that placement, and the
court eventually performed a complete about-face, as a series of later
unpublished opinions consistently located the burden in the plaintiff's
prima facie case.
The Eleventh Circuit'sAbout-Face

D.

Despite the clarity of the holding in Mealing, the Eleventh Circuit
almost immediately muddied the waters in Smith v. City of Fort
Pierce," another per curiam opinion decided one week later. In Smith,
a city employee testified in two discrimination cases against the City on
behalf of coworkers, causing the relationship with her supervisor to
disintegrate. Thereafter, the City placed her under investigation for

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

564 F. App'x 421 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 422-26.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 428, 429.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 429.
565 F. App'x 774 (11th Cir. 2014).
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attempting to bribe a City commissioner, resulting in her termination
and her Title VII retaliation suit against the City, wherein the court
granted summary judgment for the City."
In discussing the element of causation as part of the plaintiff's prima
facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Eleventh Circuit
initially noted that the plaintiff must prove the employer knew of the
protected activity and that the adverse action was "not wholly unrelated"
to that activity.8 0 However, the court then cited Nassar, noting that the
plaintiff must also prove "but for" causation." Citing Ramirez, the
court then observed the uncertainty as to the relationship between the
holding of Nassar and the plaintiff's prima facie case, ultimately
suggesting that the plaintiff "always" bears the burden of persuasion on
"but for" causation.
By holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection as
part of her prima facie case due to the lack of temporal proximity
between her testimony in the discrimination cases and her termination,
the court added to the confusion over Nassar." Even if the plaintiff had
succeeded in establishing her prima facie case, the court averred, she
could not establish "but for" causation because her alleged attempt to
bribe the City commissioner severed the causal chain between her
testimony in the other cases and her termination.8 4 By separating the
burden of proving "but for" causation from the prima facie case, the court
could be understood to be placing that burden in the pretext stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, consistent with the holding in Mealing.
Far from resolving the issue, however, Smith represented the final case
in which the court would locate the burden in the pretext stage.
Shortly after Smith, the court began to employ language appearing to
place the burden of proving "but for" causation in the plaintiff's prima
facie case. For example, in a per curiam opinion in Adams v. City of
Montgomery,85 the court enumerated the three elements of the prima
facie case-a protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a
causal connection-and immediately thereafter explained that, pursuant
to the holding of Nassar, Title VII retaliation claims require proof that
the motive to retaliate was a "but for" cause of the action, impliedly

79. Id. at 775-76.
80. Id. at 778 (quoting Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
81. Id. (quoting Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533).
82. Id. at 778-79 (quoting Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013)).
83. Id. at 779.
84. Id.
85. 569 F. App'x 769 (11th Cir. 2014).
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locating the burden in the prima facie stage." Likewise, in Jones v.
Suburban Propane, Inc.," another unpublished opinion, the court cited
the three elements and stated, "To establish a causal connection, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's desire to retaliate was a
but-for cause of the materially adverse action."" By providing this
explanation directly following a list of the elements comprising the
prima facie case, the court again intimated that the plaintiff must carry
the burden at the prima facie stage.
In Jackson v. United Parcel Service, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit
employed language nearly identical to that in Jones, although the
context in which it appeared leaves considerable ambiguity as to the
court's intent.o After listing the elements of the prima facie case, the
court described the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, wherein
the plaintiff's establishing of the prima facie case requires the defendant
to articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse action, whereupon the
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliation and pretext.e'
In the next paragraph, the court clarified that establishing causation
requires the plaintiff to prove "but for" causation.92 Because the court
noted the Nassar requirement immediately after explaining that the
McDonnell Douglas framework requires a showing of causation, a reader
reasonably could conclude that the burden must be borne at either of the
two stages. Further adding to the uncertainty, the case was decided
solely on the basis of a lack of causation evidence, leaving open the
possibility that the court was merely elucidating the only element of the
prima facie case relevant to the case at hand."
After leaving the matter unclear in Adams and Jackson, the Eleventh
Circuit finally utilized unambiguous language to locate the burden
within the prima facie stage of the case, albeit in an unpublished
decision regarding retaliatory harassment rather than "pure" retaliation.
In Swindle v. Jefferson County Commission," the court addressed the
matter of a sheriff's office laborer who allegedly experienced certain acts
of retaliatory harassment after filing a personnel complaint and an

86. Id. at 772-73.
87. 577 F. App'x 951 (11th Cir. 2014).
88. Id. at 954-55.
89. 593 F. App'x 871 (11th Cir. 2014).
90. Id. at 877 (noting that "[t]o establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the motive to retaliate was the 'but-for' cause of the adverse employment
action").
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 878.
94. 593 F. App'x 919 (11th Cir. 2014).
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EEOC charge based upon sexual harassment by two supervisors."
After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant-partially on the basis that the plaintiff failed to establish her
prima facie case because the supposedly adverse actions were not
materially adverse-the plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 96

Acknowledging the existence of a cause of action for retaliatory hostile
work environment, the court explained that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the
terms of employment or to generate an abusive environment in the
workplace." In a footnote, the court clarified that a plaintiff seeking to
establish a prima facie case of retaliatory harassment must prove that:
(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) after doing so, she was
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) her protected activity was a
"but for" cause of the harassment; (4) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of her employment;
and (5) a basis exists for holding her employer liable either directly or
vicariously."
Because Title VII retaliatory harassment claims receive the same
McDonnell Douglas analysis as retaliation claims, the court in Swindle
explicitly interpreted Nassar's "but for" requirement as impacting a
plaintiff's prima facie case for retaliation.99 In subsequent unpublished
cases, the Eleventh Circuit would continue this trend.
Shortly after the decision in Swindle, the court again affirmed that the
plaintiff's prima facie case is the stage in which the plaintiff must prove
"but for" causation. In Torres-Skair v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,"0
after listing the elements of the prima facie case, the court stated that
"[wihile this action was pending in the district court, the Supreme Court
clarified the standard for causation in retaliation cases: the plaintiff
must show that the adverse action would not have occurred but-for the
protected activity.""o' Likewise, in Rives v. Lahood,'0 2 the court's
juxtaposition of the elements of a prima facie case and the "but for"
standard announced in Nassar implies that the plaintiff must carry the
burden at the prima facie stage of the proceedings."0 s Even more

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 921-22.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 929 n.10.
Id. at 929.
595 F. App'x 847 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 857.
605 F. App'x 815 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 818-19.
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explicitly, in Clark v. South Broward Hospital District,"o" addressing
another retaliatory hostile work environment claim, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the plaintiff "failed to prove
but-for causation required to establish a prima facie case.""os Despite
some early uncertainty in the wake of Nassar-and a contrary holding
in Smith v. City of Fort Pierce-the court has begun to develop an
unmistakable pattern of locating the burden in the prima facie stage
rather than the pretext stage.
The Eleventh Circuit has remained on the same trajectory as of the
time of publication of this Comment. In Roula v. Secretary, Department
of Veterans Affairs,' 6 the court again utilized explicit language to
locate the burden in the prima facie stage, unequivocally stating that the
prima facie causation requirement necessitates a showing that the
adverse action would not have taken place but for the plaintiff's
protected activity.' Likewise, in Hawkins v. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.,108 the court listed the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie
case before explaining that Nassar requires the plaintiff to prove "but
for" causation.0 9 Immediately thereafter, the court stated that "[o]nce
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant," implying that the Supreme Court in
Nassarimposed the burden of proving "but for" causation on the plaintiff
in the prima facie stage of the case." 0
Throughout the preceding line of cases involving Title VII retaliation
claims, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals displayed a curious
reticence to address the holding of the Supreme Court in Nassarin any
direct fashion, just as the Supreme Court failed to detail precisely how
its holding would work in practice. In its initial foray into the question
in Ramirez, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly left to the district courts the
determination of whether the "but for" causation requirement impacts
the plaintiff's prima facie case or the pretext stage. After holdings in
Mealing and Smith implied that the burden rested in the pretext stage,
the court reversed course and began locating the burden in the prima
facie stage, as it appears to have done in every subsequent decision.
At the same time, every single decision on the matter has come in an
unpublished per curiam opinion, lacking the controlling authority of a

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

601 F. App'x 886 (11th Cir.
Id. at 899.
616 F. App'x 899 (11th Cir.
Id. at 902.
613 F. App'x 831 (11th Cir.
Id. at 838 (quoting Nassar,
Id. at 839.

2015).
2015).
2015).
133 S. Ct. at 2534).
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published opinion and raising questions as to why the court has been
reluctant to clear up the uncertainty. Ultimately, given that the district
courts possess more firsthand experience with the practical implications
of changes to the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary
judgment and trial stages of Title VII cases, the Eleventh Circuit may
have elected to allow the district courts to weigh in on the issue before
adopting a binding, circuit-wide position. Indeed, some district courts
have accepted the Eleventh Circuit's challenge and have explicitly
debated the merits of placing the burden in the prima facie or pretext
stage of a retaliation case.
E.

District Courts Fill the Void

After the Eleventh Circuit's initial, inconclusive foray into the impact
of Nassarin Ramirez, a majority of district courts appear to have settled
on the prima facie stage as the proper position for the plaintiff's burden
to prove "but for" causation, perhaps explaining the corresponding trend
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. District courts in the Northern
District of Alabama, the Northern District of Georgia, the Middle
District of Georgia, the Southern District of Georgia, and the Middle
District of Florida have all explicitly placed the burden in the prima
facie stage."1 ' In contrast, district courts in the Middle District of
Alabama, the Southern District of Alabama, and the Northern District

111. See Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, No. 2:12-CV-2148WMA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54484, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015) (holding that plaintiff
"must establish that her protected activity was the 'but-for' cause ... both ultimately and
at the prima facie stage"); Mathis v. City of St. Augustine Beach, No. 3:13-cv-1015-J34JRK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41649, at *70 (M.D. Fla. March 31, 2015) (noting that "[tlo
satisfy the causal connection requirement of aprima facie case, the Supreme Court recently
clarified that a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate 'but-for' causation to sustain a
retaliation claim"); Kittles v. Healthcare Staffing, Inc., No. CV 213-138, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33414, at *20 (S.D. Ga. March 18, 2015) (observing that "the 'causal relation' prong
of the plaintiffs prima facie case requires the plaintiff to show that the statutorily
protected activity was the 'but-for' cause of the adverse employment action"); Stacey-Suggs
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 44 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1287 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (noting
that plaintiff "would be required to establish the final prima facie element: a causal
connection" wherein plaintiff "must prove that 'the unlawful retaliation would not have
occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer'") (quoting
Taylor v. Cardiovascular Specialists, P.C., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2014));
Hubbard v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:11-CV-290 (CAR), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107520, at *2 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2013) (noting that the court "must now re-assess
[p]laintiffs prima facie case in light of the heightened 'but-for' causation standard now
applicable to Title VII retaliation claims").
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of Florida have held that the burden properly belongs in the pretext
stage. 11 2
The closest equivalent to a comprehensive argument in favor of
locating the burden in the prima facie stage comes from the Northern
District of Alabama. In Montgomery v. Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama,"3 the district court addressed a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation that summary judgment be granted
on behalf of the defendant, the Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama, on a claim arising out of the plaintiffs discharge two weeks
after complaining of discrimination."' In a lengthy discourse on the
effects of Nassar, the court noted that it had predicted the Supreme
Court's holding in that case, noting that prior to Nassar, the Eleventh
Circuit's standard for the element of causation merely required the
plaintiff to establish that the protected activity and the adverse action
were not wholly unrelated."'
Even prior to Nassar, the court observed, some circuits had already
adopted the "but for" causation test for Title VII retaliation cases under
the McDonnell Douglas framework.' For example, the Fifth Circuit
allowed the plaintiff to demonstrate "motivating factor" causation in the
prima facie stage before imposing the more stringent requirement of
meeting the heightened "but for" causation standard in the pretext
stage."' In other words, the plaintiff must prove that her protected
activity was a motivating reason for the employer's decision at the prima
facie stage but need not show that it constituted the sole reason until
the pretext stage."' Going even further, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit required plaintiffs to prove "but for"

112. See English v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1281
(S.D. Ala. 2015) (noting that in the pretext stage, "the burden shifts to [plaintiffs] to
demonstrate that [defendant's] proffered legitimate reasons for taking the adverse action
were a pretext for retaliation and that [plaintiffs'] protected activity was the 'but-for' cause
of the adverse action"); Terry v. Laurel Oaks Behavioral Health Ctr., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d
1250, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (noting that defendant "cites no authority that Nassarchanged
the analysis with respect to the third element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case");
Turner v. Fla., No. 4:12cv510-WS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49672, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 10,
2014) (noting that plaintiff "bears the ultimate burden of proving her retaliation claim
'according to traditional principles of but-for causation'") (quoting Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at
2533).
113. No. 2:12-CV-2148-WMA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54484 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015).
114. Id. at *1, *9.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *4-5.
117. Id. at *5 (citing Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)). See
also Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 2007).
118. Evans, 246 F.3d at 354.
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causation in the prima facie stage on the basis that post hoc ergo propter
hoc is a logical fallacy rather than a warrant to infer a causal connection."' Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit had noted, under the lessened
causation standard, "every employee would file a charge just to get a
little unemployment insurance," requiring the heightened "but for"
standard to weed out frivolous claims. 1 20
Citing Ramirez, in which the Eleventh Circuit challenged the district
courts to determine the proper role of "but for" causation in retaliation
cases, as well as a selection of the subsequent unpublished opinions on
the issue, the court in Montgomery observed "that any reluctance by the
Eleventh Circuit to fully to embrace Nassar has dissipated" and that the
district court in this case would be "willing to perform what the Eleventh
Circuit's non-binding opinion in Ramirez asked the trial court" by
expressly placing the burden of proving "but for" causation in the prima
facie portion of the plaintiff's case.12 1 Consequently, the court held that
a mere fourteen-day interval between the plaintiff's protected activity
and the defendant's adverse employment action did not suffice to meet
the heightened causation requirement because temporal proximity alone,
while sufficient to meet the "motivating factor" test, could not establish
"but for" causation as part of her prima facie case.'22
Among the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit that have
expressly placed the burden of showing "but for" causation in the pretext
stage, none have cited policy arguments in favor of that position. For
example, in Terry v. Laurel Oaks Behavioral Health Center, Inc.,123 the
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama rebuked the defendant
for "cit[ing] no authority that Nassar changed the analysis with respect
to the third element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case." 24
The court then cited the Second Circuit's holding in Kwan for the
proposition that the plaintiff's prima facie burden of proving causation

119. Montgomery, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54484, at *6-7. See also Perrywatson v.
United Airlines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that "posthoc ergo
propterhoc" is a logical fallacy); Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179(7th
Cir. 1998); Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1146 (7th Cir. 1997).
120. Montgomery, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54484, at *6 (quotingBermudez, 138 F.3d at
1179).
121. Id. at *8.
122. Id. at *9. The view of the court in Montgomery that a two-week gap cannot
establish temporal proximity appears to be an extreme case of lawmaking by a district
court. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly affirmed that two months is the maximum
length of time within which temporal proximity may be sufficient to establish causation,
with any longer period making the protected activity and the adverse action too attenuated.
See, e.g., Robinson v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., 240 F. App'x 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
123. 1 F. Supp. 3d 1250 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
124. Id. at 1277.
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remains unaffected by Nassar.125 Likewise, the District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama in English v. Board of School Commissioners126 simply affirmed that if the defendant proffers a legitimate reason
for the adverse employment action against the plaintiff, the plaintiff
then bears the burden of proving that the defendant's justification is
pretextual and that the adverse action would not have occurred but for
the plaintiff's protected activity. 1 27 At least one other district court,
following the Eleventh Circuit's lead in Smith, has held that the plaintiff
"bears the ultimate burden of proving her retaliation claim 'according to
traditional principles of but-for causation,"' implicitly locating that
burden in the pretext stage. 128 Beyond these conclusory statements,
Eleventh Circuit district courts have been reluctant to examine the
merits of the arguments on this issue. To date, the only in-depth
argument on behalf of placing the burden in the pretext stage has come
from the Fourth Circuit.
F

The Fourth Circuit'sReasoning

Despite the reluctance of Eleventh Circuit district courts to justify
applying the burden of proving "but for" causation to the pretext stage,
the Fourth Circuit has provided the most extensive analysis of the issue
from a court favoring the pretext stage. In Foster v. University of
Maryland-Eastern Shore, 2 9 the plaintiff, a female campus police
officer, reported inappropriate sexual comments and unwanted touching
by a male coworker. Although her supervisors disciplined the coworker,
the plaintiff alleged that they concurrently retaliated against her by
extending her probationary period, during which she was an at-will
employee, as well as by abruptly altering her schedule, withholding her
tuition reduction, disallowing light duty after an injury, and preventing
her from taking part in training. After the plaintiff complained about the
perceived retaliation, she received a notice of termination, prompting her
30
Title VII retaliation suit.o
Although the district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the plaintiff's discriminatory termination and hostile work
environment claims, it nevertheless held that a jury reasonably could
find that the defendant's retaliatory motive was causally connected to

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1277-78.
83 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (S.D. Ala. 2015).
Id. at 1281.
Turner, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49672, at *10 (quoting Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533).
787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 246-48.
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the plaintiff's termination.1 3 ' Because the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Nassar in the interim, the defendant moved for reconsideration. The district court granted reconsideration, along with summary
judgment, on the basis that the plaintiff could not meet the burden of
proving "but for" causation, which the district court asserted was
necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.1 32
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit began by noting that a plaintiff making
a retaliation claim essentially must prove causation at both the prima
facie and pretext stages, given that the latter requires establishing that
"the employer's undisclosed retaliatory animus was the actual cause of
her termination."1 33 Next, the court observed that the burden of
proving causation at the prima facie stage is necessarily less difficult
than at the pretext stage.' 3 4 Applying the heavier "but for" causation
burden at the prima facie stage, the court reasoned, would effectively do
away with the McDonnell Douglas framework by rendering the pretext
stage superfluous.' 3 ' As the court pointed out, a plaintiff who puts on
sufficient evidence of "but for" causation at the prima facie stage would
have no need to go through the pretext stage.1 36 Given that the pretext
stage essentially requires proving that the employer's animus actually
caused the termination, proving "but for" causation in the prima facie
stage would seemingly be dispositive of the issue without the necessity
of ever proceeding to the legitimate reason and pretext stages of the
analysis.
Although placing the burden of proving "but for" causation in the
prima facie stage would remove the need for plaintiffs with the strongest
cases to apply the McDonnellDouglas burden shifting for the subsequent
stages of the analysis, plaintiffs with weaker cases would be impaired by
that placement. As the court reasoned, if the burden lies in the prima
facie stage, a plaintiff who must rely on pretext evidence to show
causation would never be able to proceed beyond the prima facie
stage."3 ' Consequently, to hold that the plaintiff must prove "but for"
causation at the prima facie stage would be to reverse decades of
precedent involving the McDonnell Douglas framework. Analogizing the
situation to the Supreme Court's holding in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Twombly,as wherein the Court explicitly retired the traditional
pleading standard,' 9 the Fourth Circuit concluded that had the Court
intended Nassar to make more onerous the plaintiff's burden in the
prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas, it would have said so using
clear language.' 4 0 The Court's non-utilization of such language necessitates the holding that a plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation case need not
prove "but for" causation in the prima facie stage of McDonnell
'

Douglas.14

Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court's
decision in Nassarimpacts the plaintiff's causation burden at neither the
prima facie nor the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.1 42 After holding that a plaintiff may rely on "motivating factor"
causation at the prima facie stage rather than being forced to prove "but
for" causation, the court turned its attention to the effect of Nassar at
the pretext stage.1 43 As Fourth Circuit precedent established, once the
defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing both that the defendant's reason was false and that the retaliatory animus was the "real
reason" for the adverse action.'" Indeed, in the years shortly after the
advent of McDonnell Douglas, the Fourth Circuit had already interpreted the framework to require a showing of "but for" causation in the
pretext stage. 1 45
In effect, the standard set forth in Nassarhas no effect on the pretext
stage, because "but for" causation is simply another label for "real
reason" causation; that is, a plaintiff who has sufficient evidence to prove
that the employer's retaliatory animus was the real reason for the
adverse action will always be able to show that the adverse action would
not have occurred but for the plaintiff's protected activity that spawned
the employer's animus.1' Because the "real reason" and "but for"
causation standards are "functionally equivalent," the Fourth Circuit
held that the Supreme Court's decision in Nassarhad no effect on either
the prima facie stage or the pretext stage of a Title VII retaliation claim
in which the plaintiff chooses to proceed under the McDonnell Douglas

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Foster, 787 F.3d at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250-51, 252.
Id. at 251, 252.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252 n.14.
Id. at 252.
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framework.1 4 7 Accordingly, because the plaintiff provided sufficient
evidence that the real reason for her termination was the employer's
desire to retaliate against her following her complaint, the court
reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. 8
III.

THE REAL REASON FOR THE DEBATE

Although federal courts have been reticent in the extreme to provide
any detailed reasoning as to the impact of Nassar upon the McDonnell
Douglas framework, a survey of the cases provides some enlightenment
as to the policy considerations lying behind the debate. On one hand,
proponents of the prima facie stage evince deep concerns about judicial
efficiency and the need to eliminate frivolous claims. On the other,
advocates of the pretext stage emphasize the dangers of overburdening
the plaintiff at the pretext stage and the need to preserve the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework. Although the issue ultimately may
appear to be merely academic, it may have some importance in
exceptional cases, and as the debate continues, the Supreme Court may
be called upon to resolve the question of Nassar's impact upon McDonnell Douglas.
As the opinions locating the burden in the prima facie stage suggest,
the trend among district courts within the Eleventh Circuit may not be
a coincidence. By citing Fifth Circuit and Seventh Circuit precedent
requiring the plaintiff to prove "but for" causation even prior to Nassar,
the district court in Montgomery v. Board of 'lhustees14 9 drew attention

to the judicial motivations underlying the debate as to the stage in
which the burden properly belongs. On the surface, the court in
Montgomery adopted the reasoning provided by the Seventh Circuit,
asserting that the mere fact that an employer takes an action adverse

to an employee after the employee engages in a protected activity does
not warrant the conclusion that a retaliatory causal connection existed
between the protected activity and the adverse action.'
More revealing, however, is the court's reliance on the Seventh

Circuit's reasoning on the basis of judicial efficiency; as previously noted,
the Seventh Circuit explicitly adopted the position that the plaintiff
always bears the burden in the prima facie stage on the grounds that

locating the burden in the pretext stage would result in the prolonging

147. Id.
148. Id. at 253.
149. No. 2:12-CV-2148-WMA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54484 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015).
150. Id. at *6-7.

2016]

AN ONEROUS BURDEN

1019

of frivolous retaliation claims.1" Consequently, one reasonably may
infer that courts that position the burden in the prima facie stage seek
to weed out trivial and fraudulent claims as early in the proceedings as
possible. If a plaintiff proves unable to demonstrate "but for" causation
in the prima facie stage, that failure disposes of the case without the
necessity of applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting-the defendant
need not offer any legitimate reason for the termination because the
plaintiff will have already failed to establish the elements of a prima
facie case. From this perspective, because the holding of Nassar will
require the plaintiff to prove at some stage in the McDonnell Douglas
framework that the defendant's retaliatory animus actually caused the
adverse actions, a plaintiff who cannot make a prima facie case of
retaliation could never establish that the defendant's proffered reason
was a mere pretext. Accordingly, the district courts would be empowered
to dismiss more Title VII retaliation claims at the summary judgment
stage without advancing to trial.
If the district courts that advocate for the prima facie position do so
on the basis of practical considerations such as judicial efficiency and the
need to eliminate fraudulent claims, their arguments, although perhaps
not based on the most erudite legal reasoning, at least have the virtue
of comporting with the Supreme Court's explicit pronouncements in
Nassar. Indeed, there the Court admitted in no uncertain terms that its
decision had "central importance to the fair and responsible allocation
of resources in the judicial and litigation systems." 52 As the Court
noted, the number of EEOC claims based on retaliation had increased
from 16,000 in 1997 to 31,000 in 2012, exceeding the frequency of all
other EEOC charges with the exception of those for race-based discrimination."'s Likewise, the Court's hypothetical scenario, wherein an
employee files a baseless discrimination charge with the EEOC prior to
an anticipated termination, reflects a profound fear that district courts
are wasting time and expenses on fraudulent claims."
Although the Court couched its concern in terms of the inequitable
costs to employers of defending such frivolous suits, the same argument
applies with equal force to the district courts tasked with overseeing
retaliation cases from inception through the discovery process until
summary judgment, a significant investment of time and expense. As a
result, the pattern of support among district courts for placing the

151. Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1176, 1179.
152. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
153. Id. See also EEOC, Charge StatisticsFY 1997 Through FY2012, http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).
154. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
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burden of proving "but for" causation in the prima facie stage represents
a logical extension of the Court's reasoning in Nassar, and, in the wake
of Mealing and Smith, the Eleventh Circuit appears to have accepted
this argument, as the district court in Montgomery expected.
In contrast, proponents of the pretext stage appear to be less
concerned with judicial efficiency, instead prioritizing a light burden in
the prima facie stage so that a plaintiff may proceed to the legitimate
reason and pretext stages of the analysis. Since the inception of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, courts have emphasized that the prima
facie stage does not impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff. In oft-quoted
language from Burdine, the Supreme Court remarked of the application
of McDonnell Douglas to discriminatory treatment cases that "[t]he
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not
onerous," noting that the prima facie stage simply functions to remove
the most frequent nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action
taken against the plaintiff.' Federal courts have applied the same
reasoning to the utilization of McDonnell Douglas in retaliation
cases.' For the Fourth Circuit in Foster, and presumably to the
various other courts that have located the burden in the pretext stage,
to require the plaintiff to prove "but for" causation in the prima facie
stage would be to contravene the Supreme Court's declaration that the
prima facie burden must not be onerous.
Moreover, as the court in Foster asserted, the pretext stage itself
appears to be simply another label for "but for" causation. Once a
plaintiff establishes the elements of the prima facie case, the defendant
has the opportunity to provide a legitimate reason for its action adverse
to the plaintiff, at which point the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the proffered reason is merely pretextual and that the adverse
action was, in truth, motivated by the defendant's retaliatory animus
based on the plaintiff's protected activity. In effect, the pretext stage
already required the plaintiff to meet the causation standard required
by Nassar, and the court in Foster correctly concluded that applying the
holding of Nassar to a prima facie case of retaliation would upend
decades of McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence by imposing a heavy
burden on the plaintiff's initial case, preventing many meritorious claims
from ever reaching the pretext stage, and rendering the pretext stage
redundant for those plaintiffs with the best evidence.

155. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
156. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cardiovascular Specialists, P.C., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1380 (N.D.
Ga. 2014); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007); Eckman v. Superior
Indus. Intern., Inc., No. 05-2318-DJW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48011, at *17 n.24 (D. Kan.
July 2, 2007).
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Although the Fourth Circuit in Foster presented a convincing case for
placing the burden in the pretext stage, the court did not address a
significant counterargument. A Title VII retaliation claim may be
dismissed at the summary judgment stage not on the basis of any failure
to prove a prima facie case, but due to insufficient evidence to prove that
the defendant's proffered reason was pretextual."' Indeed, at summary
judgment, the district court will consider the parties' arguments as to all
three stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework, and frequently the
court will assume arguendo that the plaintiff has met her burden of
proving the prima facie case, only to grant summary judgment based on
insufficient evidence of pretext. That is, even if the plaintiff has
established the prima facie elements-a protected activity, an adverse
action, and a causal connection between the two-as a matter of law the
plaintiff cannot meet the burden of proving pretext.1 5 8 Contrary to the
Fourth Circuit's concern that some plaintiffs with meritorious cases
would never be able to proceed past the prima facie stage to reach the
pretext stage, that distinction may be merely academic if the case is
ultimately dismissed on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to meet her
burden at the pretext stage. In either scenario, a plaintiff who cannot
prove "but for" causation will lose the case at summary judgment.
However, as the Fourth Circuit asserted in Foster, a plaintiff who
lacks evidence sufficient to prove "but for" causation may nevertheless
have the ability to show that the defendant's proffered reason for its
adverse action was pretextual."' Although the Fourth Circuit did not
elaborate on this argument, based on the kinds of evidence by which a
plaintiff may prove retaliation, the plaintiff may effectively succeed
under the McDonnell Douglas framework without providing evidence of
"but for" causation until trial. For example, the plaintiff, relying on
circumstantial evidence such as the temporal proximity between her
protected activity and the adverse action against her, may be able to
show in the prima facie stage that the defendant's retaliatory animus
constituted a motivating factor for the adverse action against her. If the
defendant then proffers a legitimate reason for the adverse action, the
plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the defendant's reason was
merely a ruse. Such evidence of pretext may include the defendant's

157. See, e.g., Hall v. Franklin Cnty., No. 3:13-CV-137 (CAR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132195, at *28-29 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2015) (holding that "even assuming arguendo that
the Court was to find Plaintiff established causation to prove her prima facie case,
Plaintiffs claim would still fail because she cannot rebut Defendant's legitimate nonretaliatory reasons as pretext").
158. Id.
159. Foster, 787 F.3d at 251.
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shifting explanations of the reason for the action, as well as a failure to
follow internal policies in taking the action.1 6 0 On the basis of such
evidence, a jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant's reason
was pretextual and that the desire to retaliate against the plaintiff
constituted the real reason for the defendant's adverse action.
In this scenario, even at the pretext stage, the plaintiff has not,
strictly speaking, put on evidence proving that the adverse action would
not have occurred but for the defendant's animus. However, based on the
pretext evidence of the defendant's failure to consistently articulate the
reason for its actions or to follow its own policies, a jury could infer that
the plaintiff has carried her ultimate burden of showing "but for"
causation. By placing that burden in the prima facie stage, as the
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly done in unpublished opinions, the
plaintiff in such a scenario probably would not be allowed to proceed
beyond the summary judgment stage due to a lack of prima facie
evidence of "but for" causation. Indeed, only the plaintiff's pretext
evidence would allow an inference that the adverse action would not
have occurred but for the defendant's desire to retaliate against the
plaintiff. As a result, a potentially meritorious claim would be disposed
of in summary judgment based on the plaintiff's inability to meet the
prima facie standard of "but for" causation.
To be sure, such a scenario may rarely occur. If the plaintiff lacks any
evidence from which "but for" causation may be inferred by the finder of
fact, the case may appropriately be dismissed at summary judgment.
Perhaps, as the Supreme Court worried in Nassar, the vast majority of
retaliation cases are frivolous. However, the desire to close the floodgates
of Title VII retaliation cases by placing the burden in the prima facie
stage likely will preclude some meritorious cases from going to trial, and
judicial efficiency may be cold comfort to an employee who complains
about a legitimate instance of discrimination, files a retaliation claim,
and learns that she will not have the opportunity to be heard by a
jury. 161

IV.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the merits-or lack thereof-of the Supreme Court's holding
in Nassar, the circuit courts of appeals must face the reality that the
plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation case must prove "but for" causation at

160. Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298.
161. Due to the inherent difficulties in utilizing the "floodgates" argument to decide
cases and fashion law, courts that rely on it should attempt to provide more persuasive
justifications for their decisions. See Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the
"Floodgatesof Litigation,"6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2003).
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some stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework. At present, the
Eleventh Circuit, which initially appeared to favor placing the burden
in the pretext stage, appears to have settled on the prima facie stage in
a fairly consistent line of cases following Mealing and Smith. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has yet to rule on the issue in a binding
opinion, preferring to utilize unpublished opinions to address cases in
which Nassar's impact on McDonnell Douglas is implicated. Although
the reasons for the Eleventh Circuit's curious reticence to resolve the
issue head-on remain unclear, the court may have elected, pursuant to
its remarks in Ramirez, to delay so that the debate may play out in the
district courts. Because the district courts must deal with the situation
on the ground-the practical difficulties of administering the complexities of the McDonnell Douglas framework at both the summary
judgment and trial stages of litigation-the Eleventh Circuit may have
chosen to defer to the lower courts' expertise on the matter.
In light of the Eleventh Circuit's deference, the current state of affairs
probably reflects the inclinations of district courts, most of which have
joined the court of appeals in locating the burden of proving "but for"
causation in the prima facie stage. Much as the Supreme Court based its
reasoning in Nassar at least in part on the flood of Title VII retaliation
suits in recent years, a majority of district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit appear to have agreed with the reasoning in Montgomery that
placement of the burden in the prima facie stage is necessary to dispose
of dubious claims at summary judgment, thereby saving the district
courts from having to administer lengthy and expensive trials.
While the current trend in the Eleventh Circuit reflects the valid
concerns of the district courts, their unwillingness to actually argue on
behalf of their positions indicates that the Eleventh Circuit's deference
has been less fruitful than it perhaps anticipated. The debate over
Nassar'simpact on McDonnell Douglas can only proceed if the advocates
of each position actually put forth and respond to arguments. Thus far,
however, only a single district court in the Eleventh Circuit-the court
in Montgomery-has even come close to elucidating the legal reasoning
behind its decision to locate the burden in the prima facie stage.
Similarly, no Eleventh Circuit district court favoring the pretext position
has provided any reasoning on the question, despite the availability of
defensible arguments in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Foster. While
advocates of the prima facie stage may be motivated by a desire to avoid
exposing their reliance on a crude argument such as judicial efficiency,
proponents of the pretext stage have no such excuse, indicating that the
ultimate blame may lie with either the Eleventh Circuit for its lack of
guidance or with the United States Supreme Court for departing from
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decades of Title VII jurisprudence in the first place, leaving the lower
courts to sort out the confusion.
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and most of the
district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have chosen to place the
burden in the prima facie stage of the analysis, on balance, the Fourth
Circuit has most persuasively argued that the burden properly belongs
in the pretext stage. To the extent that the pretext stage of McDonnell
Douglas already requires plaintiffs to show that the defendant's
proffered legitimate reasons were merely ruses and that the animus to
retaliate constituted the real reason for the adverse action, the pretext
stage already encompasses the "but for" causation requirement.
Consequently, requiring such a showing at the prima facie stage would
obviate any need for the pretext stage for plaintiffs with strong cases,
while plaintiffs with weaker, but still meritorious, cases would be less
likely to survive summary judgment.
Although the district courts understandably may wish to lighten their
own loads by ensuring that few retaliation claims proceed to trial,
requiring the plaintiff to prove "but for" causation in the prima facie
stage forces the plaintiff to shoulder too onerous a burden, contrary to
the original purposes of McDonnell Douglas. Should the Supreme Court
elect to resolve the existing circuit split as to whether Nassar impacts
the prima facie stage or the pretext stage of McDonnell Douglas, it
should reject the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit and adopt that of the
Fourth Circuit. Given, however, that the Court explicitly based its
holding in Nassar on the need to restrict a flood of supposedly frivolous
retaliation claims, proponents of the pretext stage as the proper home for
the burden are likely to be disappointed.
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